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WHEN WELL-BEING TRUMPS LIBERTY: POLITICAL
THEORY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
WILLIAM GALSTON*

INTRODUCTION

As is so often the case, I find myself in sympathy with the broad
thrust of Amitai Etzioni's argument.' In this Article, therefore, I will
try to dig a bit deeper in the soil Etzioni has already turned. I will
suggest that common sense, liberal democratic theory, and constitutional jurisprudence come together to support his critique of First
Amendment absolutism, certainly as it applies to minors.
I need to issue a caveat at the outset, however. Despite the best
efforts of contemporary scholars obsessed with the alleged normativity of constitutional interpretation, there remains a significant gap
between constitutional judgments and whatever brand of political and
moral theory one prefers. A constitution is in part an aspect of positive law. As such, it may permit or, worse, command what normative
theory forbids (and vice versa). Throughout U.S. history, African
Americans have been more sensitive than others to this sad disjunction: whether or not Dred Scott2 was sound, it was impossible to deny
that many fugitive slave laws fell within the four corners of the positive law of the Constitution. Morally sensitive citizens could find
themselves legally required to cooperate in returning runaways to
morally intolerable conditions.
Let me apply this idea to the considerably less apocalyptic questions before us now. It is perfectly true that First Amendment claims,
or protections, are not "absolute." A substantial body of constitutional jurisprudence has worked out the circumstances in which (say)
speech may be restricted and the rationales for such restrictions. It
does not follow, however, that First Amendment guarantees are no
* Saul Stern Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland; Director, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy; Director, Center for Information and Research on Civic
Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE).
1. Amitai Etzioni, On ProtectingChildren from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (2004).
2. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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weightier than other constitutionally relevant considerations. Writing
for the majority in Prince v. Massachusetts, Justice Rutledge denied
that "any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be
given higher place than the others. '3 He went on to insist, "[a]ll have
preferredposition in our basic scheme."'4 If so, we are not free simply
to balance speech, or religious free exercise, against considerations of
social utility.
Given the fact that some constitutional norms enjoy special
status, those who seek to restrict them labor under a significant burden of proof. In recognition of this, the Court has developed tests to
shape the process of deliberative balancing that reflect the asymmetrical constitutional force of the competing considerations. The question is whether, and how, restraints on speech directed at minors can
meet such tests.
The laws and practices that can pass constitutional muster may
not be fully congruent with plausible conceptions of wise policy, even
those guided by compelling visions of a good society. Professor Etzioni is one of the world's foremost communitarian thinkers. I am a
liberal pluralist with communitarian sympathies. Neither of us can
assume that the Constitution entails, or even permits, all aspects of
his preferred position. To do so would be to repeat the error of scholars who labored more honorably than wisely to locate John Rawls's
Difference Principle within the penumbras and emanations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5
I.

A COMMONSENSE UNDERSTANDING OF INFANTS AND
CHILDREN

Infants are born vulnerable and dependent, with an ensemble of
vital interests that they cannot defend through their own efforts. As
they mature, children raised in moderately favorable circumstances
gradually develop their capacity for "agency": that is, the ability to
internalize key social rules and to coexist on reasonable terms with
other members of their society, to frame for themselves a conception
of the life they wish to lead, and to reflect sensibly on the means required for that life. Over the years from birth to (say) age twenty-one,
3. 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. For a skeptical but open-minded exploration of this issue, see Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA L.
REV. 962 (1973).
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external institutions (states, families, associations) gradually yield
their temporary power to act on behalf of children, defining and defending children's interests. Young adults, however, are presumed to
have the capacities of agency needed to do this on their own.
This developmental perspective has important moral and theoretical consequences. At birth, infants have powerful claims (on other
individuals and on the political community) based on their welfare or
well-being, but almost no claims based upon their agency. As children
mature, the morally appropriate balance between welfare claims and
agency claims gradually shifts, as does the locus of responsibility for
both defining and attaining the content of welfare. By the age of maturity, young people are presumed to be able to define for themselves, within broad limits, a conception of well-being, and efforts on
the part of others to do so for them are regarded as (at best) misguided paternalism. At the same time, young adults are presumed to
be far more able than minors to provide for themselves the wherewithal for moving toward their preferred understanding of well-being.
In short, their enhanced agency implied both agency-rights and
6
agency-responsibilities.
Taking as his point of departure this commonsense developmental perspective, Etzioni rightly points out that social orders can go
wrong in two opposite ways, which have in common the failure to
take seriously the distinction between adults and children. If children
are treated as mini-adults, the law puts them at risk by failing to recognize their distinctive needs, vulnerabilities, and dependencies. On
the other hand, if adults are treated as overgrown children, the law
slips into an unwarranted paternalism that is at best condescending
and at worst tyrannical.
Chronology is not destiny, of course. Some individuals in their
early teens are capable of making for themselves a wide range of
adult decisions. The law cannot make individualized determinations
and instead establishes age thresholds as general norms for the exercise of agency in areas such as marriage, voting, and military service.
Conversely, some individuals are congenitally unable to develop adult
agency, while others suffer diminution of their capacities through
accident, disease, or unwise choices. In such cases, the law does attempt to make individualized judgments. Because the determination
6. For a sophisticated discussion along these general lines, see Harry Brighouse, What
Rights (if Any) do Children Have?, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 31
(David Archard & Colin M. Macleod eds., 2002).
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that an individual suffers from diminished agency typically entails a
loss of liberty, parties urging such decisions must discharge a significant burden of proof.
Although I cannot argue the point at length here, I would suggest
that legal and cultural changes over the past generation have combined to increase this burden. For example, it is far more difficult
than it once was to institutionalize mentally ill individuals involuntarily. Similarly, it is more difficult for adults to restrict minors' freedom
of speech and expression, or to exercise disciplinary authority over
minors without granting them a wide range of due process rights.7
The question Professor Etzioni raises is whether these and related developments have gone so far to become inconsistent with the
well-being of minors and, if so, whether the U.S. legal system has the
resources to strike a more reasonable balance. I shall argue that the
balance already struck in settled case law is well suited to resolve, in a
sensible manner, the kinds of cases Etzioni considers. But first, I want
to approach the question from a more theoretical standpoint.
II. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO POLITICAL THEORY AND
BACK AGAIN: LIBERAL PLURALISM AND BALANCING BASIC
VALUES

In recent years, a number of political theorists have been working to reconceptualize liberalism in a manner that incorporates Isaiah
Berlin's important insights concerning value pluralism.8 In this section
I want to (1) set forth the essentials of value pluralism, (2) trace the
implications of value pluralism for our understanding of constitutions,
and (3) bring this theory to bear on the U.S. Constitution.
A.

Value Pluralism

I will summarize the essentials of value pluralism in four propositions.
First, value pluralism is not relativism. The distinction between good
and bad, good and evil, and right and wrong is objective and rationally defensible.

7. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. For my contribution to this genre, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE chs. 1 & 6

(2002).
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Second, objective goods cannot be fully rank-ordered. This
means that there is no common measure for all goods, which are
rather qualitatively heterogeneous. It means that there is no summum
bonum, that is, the chief good for all individuals. It means that there
are no comprehensive lexical orderings among types of goods. It also
means that there is no "first virtue of social institutions," but rather a
range of public goods and virtues whose relative importance will depend on circumstances.
Third, some goods are basic in the sense that they form part of
any choice-worthy conceptions of a human life. To be deprived of
such goods is to be forced to endure the great evils of human existence. All decent regimes do what they can to minimize the frequency
and scope of such deprivations.
Fourth, beyond this parsimonious list of basic goods, there is a
wide range of legitimate diversity, of individual conceptions of good
lives, and also of public cultures and purposes. This range of legitimate diversity defines the appropriate zone of individual liberty, of
deliberation and public decision making, and of constitutional design.
B.

PluralistConstitutionalism

Every political community assumes a distinctive form and identity through its constitution. A constitution, we may say, represents an
authoritative partial ordering of public values. It selects a subset of
worthy values, brings them to the foreground, and subordinates others to them. These preferred values then become the benchmarks for
assessing legislation, public policy, and even the condition of public
culture. Various aspects of this definition require further elaboration.
Within the pluralist understanding, to begin, there is no single
constitutional ordering that is rationally preferable to all otherscertainly not across differences of space, time, and culture, and arguably not even within a given situation. Nonetheless, the worth of a
constitution can be assessed along three dimensions, call them realism, coherence, and congruence. A constitution is realistic if the demands it places on citizens are not too heavy for them to bear. A
constitution is coherent if the ensemble of values it represents is not
too diverse to coexist within the same community. A constitution is
congruent if its broad outlines correspond to the moral sentiments of
the community and to the situation that community confronts.
A constitution represents only a "partial ordering" of value in
three senses. In the first place, there is no guarantee that a commu-
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nity's distinctive constitutional values will always be consistent with
the minimum requirements of public order, or that in cases of conflict, public order must yield to constitutional values. Second, it is not
the case that constitutional values will always dominate an individual's ensemble of personal values. There are circumstances in which it
is not unreasonable for individuals to place the values at the core of
their identity above the requirements of citizenship.
Third, a constitution is only a partial ordering because the plurality of values that it establishes as preferred will unavoidably come
into conflict with one another. Such conflicts are a familiar feature of
U.S. constitutionalism. Public purposes understood in the consequentialist manner ("domestic tranquility") may clash with individual
rights understood deontologically (a "fair trial"). And individual
rights may themselves come into conflict; consider the tension between the right to a fair trial and freedom of the press.
From a pluralist standpoint, it is inevitable that many of these
conflicts will have no single rationally compelling solution. Reasonable men and women may well disagree about the relative weight to
be attached to competing values, and many will be able to make legitimate appeal to different features of the constitutional framework.
There are no strict lexical orderings, even in theory, among basic values.
In The FederalistNo. 51, James Madison poses a famous rhetorical question: "[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" 9 And he continues, "If men were angels,
no government would be necessary." 10 A philosophical pluralist must
disagree. Even if every individual were angelic in Madison's senseperfectly capable of subordinating ambition and self-interest to reason and public spirit-nonetheless the incapacity of human reason to
fully resolve clashes among worthy values means that authoritative
mechanisms for resolving disputes remain indispensable. The more
reasonable individuals are, the more clearly they will understand the
need for such mechanisms. This is true even if there is broad public
consensus on constitutional matters-that is, on the ensemble of values that are to be brought into the foreground.
From a pluralist standpoint, individuals vested with the power to
make authoritative decisions-whether judicial, legislative, or executive-must understand that many of the controversies they are called
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
10. Id.
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on to resolve represent the clash not of good and bad, but rather of
good and good. This means that these individuals must carry out their
duties in a particular spirit: to the maximum extent feasible, their decisions should reflect what is valuable, not only to the winners, but
also to the losers. Sometimes this will not be possible. But when not
required by the logic of the matter to be resolved, winner-take-all
decisions needlessly (and therefore wrongfully) diverge from the balance of underlying values at stake.
C. PluralistConstitutionalismand Presumption
It may appear that pluralist constitutionalism yields a degree of
indeterminacy fatal to the rule of law. I shall argue that this indeterminacy is constrained within practical bounds through a structure of
relationships between values that I shall call presumption.
More than three decades ago, the noted student of jurisprudence
Chaim Perelman observed that few philosophers have explored
analogies between philosophy and law. Starting with Plato, many
have suggested parallels between philosophy and mathematics. More
recently, others have tried to refashion philosophy along the lines of
natural science. But important structural similarities between philosophy and law have been neglected, Perelman suggests."
In law, reasonable and honest people can reach differing conclusions (unlike mathematics) such that additional evidence cannot suffice to overcome their differences (unlike the sciences). The ubiquity
of reasonable disagreement in the law suggests a conception of rational decision that is neither determined by truth nor driven by arbitrary will, and it makes necessary structures of decision that can give
authoritative force to one reasonable view over others. Indeed,
Perelman argues, the very coherence of the idea of authority rests on
this conception of decisions that are consistent with but not required
by reason. Authority is superfluous, or 2at best derivative, in spheres in
1
which reason compels a unique result.
Perelman's account of reasonable disagreement is more than a
little reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of deliberation. Aristotle
begins, and proceeds, by enumerating the matters about which we do
not deliberate: mathematical truths, law-governed regularities of na11. CH. PERELMAN, What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law, in JUSTICE
91-110 (1967).
12. Id. at 107.
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ture, matters of chance, or particular facts, among others. Instead, we
deliberate about matters of human agency in which actions do not
generate fully predictable results, matters in which "though subject to
rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue." 13 So deliberation is the effort to choose the best course, all things considered,
in circumstances in which reason shapes but does not fully determine
that course.
Perelman takes Aristotle's argument one important step farther.
The nature of law, and of practical deliberation more generally,
points toward the necessary ground of human freedom:
Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling
nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which
a reasonable choice can be exercised. If freedom was no more than
necessary adherence to a previously given natural order, it would
exclude all possibility of choice; and if the exercise of freedom were
not based on reasons, every choice would be irrational and would
be reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual
14
void.
In short, neither Spinoza's determinism nor Sartre's decisionism
can explain human freedom as we experience and practice it. Freedom operates in a zone of partial but not complete regularity, a discursive arena in which some reasons are better than others but none
is clearly dominant over all the rest in every situation. If ethics and
politics are part of this zone, as they evidently are, then their substance will reflect this ceaseless interplay of strong but not compelling
reasons grappling with the variability of practical circumstances.
Perelman observes that every system of law embodies a presumption in favor of past decisions. The new and the old do not have
to be treated in the same fashion; law teaches us to abandon existing
rules only if good reasons justify their replacement. This presumption
is not absolute, but the burden of proof falls on those advocating
change.15 In a similar spirit, the nineteenth-century scholar Richard
Whately, one of the founders of the modern study of argumentation,

13. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1112b7-9 (H. Rackham trans., 1934). For an
outstanding discussion of Aristotelian deliberation influenced by value pluralism, see D. Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in PRACTICAL REASONING 144-52 (Joseph Raz ed.,

1978).
14.

CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON

ARGUMENTATION 514 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1969) (1958).
15. PERELMAN, supra note 11, at 104; see also PERELMAN& OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra
note 14, at § 17.
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contended that while the majority of existing institutions and practices are susceptible of improvement, nonetheless
the "Burden of proof" lies with him who proposes an alteration;
simply, on the ground that since a change is not a6 good in itself, he
who demands a change should show cause for it.1
The reasoning underlying this stance is straightforward. The merits and defects of the status quo are well known. Unless the status quo
is so intolerable that any change would be for the better, or at least
not for the worse, then there is a possibility that a proposed change
could produce a state of affairs that is even less desirable than the
admittedly defective status quo. That is why the burden of proof is on
the advocate of change to show why the proposed reform is unlikely
to make matters worse, all things considered, and that those at greatest risk of harm are situated well enough to take a hit without suffering a devastating loss that no one would reasonably accept.
In an important article, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III elaborates
on the conception of presumption in a legal context. As a backdrop,
he sketches two opposed pure notions of judging: strict adherence to
rules, without exception, and equity-based jurisprudence that takes its
bearings from the facts of each case. The problem with strict rules is
that they will inevitably run up against exceptional cases in which
their application will appear harsh and unreasonable. The problem
with unfettered equity is that it provides little predictability or uni7
formity, diluting the principal advantages of the rule of law. (For
purposes of this discussion, I will follow Wilkinson in presupposing
that the result or meaning of applying rules to particular cases is not
in doubt. The frequent uncertainty of interpreting rules raises other
questions that I want to set aside for now.)
Against this backdrop, the jurisprudence of presumptions
emerges as an attempt to combine the advantages of rules-clarity,
predictability, uniformity -with those of flexibility, prudence, and
common sense. The strength of a legal presumption, Wilkinson declares, "lies in its rootedness in the rule of law; its vulnerability lies in
the inability of the drafter of any legal rule to 18anticipate all the factual
circumstances to which it may be applicable.'

16. RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC 91 (photo. reprint 1991) (1846).
17. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward A Jurisprudenceof Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 907, 908-10 (1992).
18. Id. at 908.
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In a famous discussion, Aristotle suggests that this combination
of strength and vulnerability is inherent in the nature of law and lawmaking itself:
Law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is
not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore
where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not unaware of the error this involves.
And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error is not in the
law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material of
conduct is essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a
general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to
the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the
defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were
present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been
cognizant of the case in question. 9
Because the tension between generality and particularity is inherent in the nature of law, there are, Wilkinson suggests, no exceptionless absolute principles in law. Those that may appear absolute
are, in fact, strong presumptions that may be overcome in specific
circumstances. Not that rebutting a strong presumption is easy; one
may understand it as a well-defended fortress that would require a
powerful assault to conquer.
Some presumptions are stronger than others. In American constitutional law, the presumption in favor of free political speech can
be overcome only by the most compelling public interest; in criminal
cases, the presumption of innocence can be overcome only by evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a difficult standard to
meet. The burden of proof in civil cases is less stringent-the preponderance (that is, the greater part) of the evidence is required to sustain the plaintiff's claim.
In part, the variation among standards governing the burden of
proof in different categories of cases reflects differences among the
goods and values at stake. In a criminal case, for example, an individual's life and liberty are at stake. The prosecution's burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is designed to minimize the chances that
individuals will be wrongfully deprived of these very great goods,
which enjoy the status of natural as well as civil rights in American
civic philosophy. The system cannot wholly eliminate the possibility
of such wrongful deprivation, however. The only way to do so is never
19. ARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 1137b12-24.
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to convict anyone of a felony, which would deprive the entire society
of the advantages of the rule of law. In a universe of plural and competing goods, highly demanding protections for accused persons may
impose excessive costs along other key dimensions of public value.
We can go farther, Judge Wilkinson suggests, towards a precise
account of how the jurisprudence of presumptions operates in practice. 20 First, the adjudicator must identify the relevant rule of law.
Second, the "presumptive strength" of that rule must be identified.
As we have seen, some rules enjoy a preferred position in our constitutional system, while others are secondary or tertiary. Third, the
adjudicator must assess the "degree of stress" that an unforeseen circumstance imposes on that rule. In the case of political speech, for
example, not only must the countervailing state interest be powerful
as a matter of principle, but the facts of the particular case must also
clearly bring that interest into play. Fourth, the adjudicator must
specify, so far as possible, the costs of departing from the rule laid
down, including not only the costs in the particular case, but also the
longer-term damage to the credibility of the rule itself. Finally, the
decision-maker must explain why the result achieved by making an
exception to the rule is preferable, all things considered, to following
21
the rule.
I want to underscore two features of this schema. First, it does
not identify some neutral point of equipoise between the jurisprudence of rules and the jurisprudence of equity. Legal rules enjoy a
status very different from that of (say) propositions advanced in a
dialogue. If laid down by those duly empowered to create them, the
rules have presumptive authority flowing from their source. There is a
presumption-stronger in some cases than others, but always powerful-in favor of applying the rules laid down. The burden of proof lies
on those who would relax the rules or carve out exceptions to them.
In these circumstances, it would not suffice to show that making an
accommodation would yield an outcome just as good, all things considered, as following the rule. A preponderance of considerations
must point toward the exception being sought. Just how strong of a
preponderance will depend on the nature of the rule in question.
Second, the process of justifying the exception often takes place
in a context of multiple values. The rule in question, let us say, seeks
to promote a particular public value. The case for granting an excep20. Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 914.
21. Id.
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tion will typically appeal to a different value; if allowed to operate
without modification in pursuit of its intended value, it may be alleged, the rule will exact too high a price as measured along another
important dimension of value that the system of law cannot reasonably ignore.
In the next section of this Article, I will argue that legal disputes
over the application of First Amendment freedoms to children exemplify this way of thinking about conflicts among values. Specifically, a
settled tradition of case law identifies an independent and significant
state interest in the well-being of minors, an interest that modifies
both the interpretation and the scope of rights as normally understood in the context of adults.
III. THE WELL-BEING AND RIGHTS OF MINORS: SOME LEADING
CASES

Consider, first, Prince v. Massachusetts, decided in 1944.22 The
facts were these: A Massachusetts statute prohibited minors from
selling newspapers, periodicals, or other articles of merchandise in
public places, including streets. The same statute made it unlawful for
any adult to furnish to a minor any article that the adult knows the
minor intends to sell in a public place. Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness and the aunt and guardian of a nine-year-old girl, provided her
ward with religious literature and accompanied her as she sold it in
the streets. Arrested and convicted pursuant to the statute, she appealed on the grounds that it contravened the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging her freedom of religion and violating the principle
23
of equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court denied Ms. Prince's appeal for relief. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Rutledge began (as we have
already seen) by adverting to the preferred position First Amendment liberties enjoy in our constitutional scheme. For that reason, he
observed, "To make accommodation between these freedoms and an
exercise of state authority always is delicate," especially when those
freedoms substantially apply to minors as well as adults. 24 And they
do. In particular, the rights of children to exercise their religion and of
parents and guardians to direct the religious upbringing of their chil22. 321 U.S. 158.
23. Id. at 159-61.
24. Id. at 165.
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dren have received recognition on numerous occasions. Nonetheless,
Rutledge continued, "neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation." 2 The challenge then becomes to determine the appropriate standard for distinguishing between appropriate
and inappropriate limitations.
One thing is clear, Rutledge states: a law similar to the disputed
Massachusetts statute but applying to adults rather than minors
would be invalid. 26 Given the preferred position of religious freedom,
the claim supporting state intervention against adult conduct must
involve some "clear and present danger," which is manifestly absent
in this case. 27 "But the mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this
form of adult activity.., does not mean it cannot do so for children.... The state's authority over children's activities is broader

than over like actions of adults." The reason is this: "A democratic
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers
within a broad range of selection. '29 Though relevant, the presence of
a parent or guardian directing and supervising the child is not decisive. Not only are parental rights themselves subject to limitation, but
also, there is no guarantee that parental presence will suffice to forestall the evils the state seeks to prevent. 30
In sum, the opinion of the Court stands for two propositions: that
there is a difference between children and adults; and that this difference rightly affects the balance to be struck between liberty and welfare. In jurisprudential terms, the balance is shaped by the test courts
employ to determine the validity of a contested state intervention.
The majority opinion in Prince suggests that it is enough for the state
to show a rational relationship between some important aspect of
children's well-being and its proposed restraints on their liberties.
It was certainly possible to dissent from this line of reasoning,
and Justice Murphy did so. While he conceded the abstract proposition that the power of the state over children is greater than over
adults, he proposed a much stricter test for legitimate state intervention. It is not enough to show that an intervention was reasonable. If
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

ld. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

166.
167.
168.
169.
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we truly believe what we profess, that First Amendment freedoms are
central to our system of ordered liberty, then we cannot accept their
infringement for any reasons other than the weightiest: "If the right of
a child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by
constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a
practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to
the health, morals or welfare of the child."31 The state had manifestly
failed to discharge this burden in this case.
While this test is demanding, it is not impossible to meet. For example, the state may intervene against parents who withhold medical
treatment from a child with a life-threatening illness, even if sincere
religious belief lies at the heart of the parents' stance. But it would be
much harder for the state to act consistently with Justice Murphy's
test in cases involving "morals" rather than health, for two reasons:
the definition of morals may be at issue, and the requisite evidence
concerning the link between parental behavior (or state policy) on
children's moral well-being may be much harder to adduce. If Professor Etzioni's article accurately represents the current state of social
science on such questions, it might well be possible, consistent with
Justice Murphy's standard, to sustain limits on violence in media to
which children are exposed. It would probably not be possible to sustain comparable limits on the depiction of sexual behavior.
There was another possible position on the issue before the
Court, and three members led by Justice Jackson adopted it. Concurring in the majority's result, Jackson emphatically rejected the
grounds of their opinion. The crucial issue, he argued, was not
whether adults or children are conducting the activity whose regulation is in question, but rather whether the activity falls within the public or private sphere. "Religious activities which concern only
members of the faith," he asserted, "are and ought to be free-as
nearly absolutely free as anything can be."'32 State-imposed limits operate legitimately "whenever activities begin to affect or collide with
liberties of others or of the public."33 In setting aside the distinction
between public and private action, he argued, the majority risked
legitimating a wide range of state intrusions into activities that should
be immune. If minors may not sell literature in public, may they carry
collection plates in churches? If minors can be forbidden to engage in
31. Id. at 173-74 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 177 (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
33. Id.
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paid construction work, may they also be forbidden to participate in
barn-raisings that churches organize for their members? Surely not.
Assuming that the condition of external effects is satisfied, Justice Jackson continued, the remaining question is whether the state
regulation is even-handed or discriminatory. It cannot be directed
against specific religious activities. Nor can it be arbitrary and capricious. The regulation stands if it is consistent with equal protection of
the laws, as it is in the case of Massachusetts's prohibition of public
commercial activities on the part of minors. 34 Unlike (say) race, age is
not a suspect classification. Far from being constitutionally questionable, child labor laws are perfectly reasonable. Given the "publicness" of the cases Professor Etzioni presents, Justice Jackson's
standard would seem to validate state action, at least in those cases in
which it is possible to constrain collateral damage in the form of spillovers within acceptably narrow limits.
I turn now to the second case I wish to examine, Ginsberg v. New
York.35 The plaintiff in this case operated a luncheonette that also
sold periodicals of various sorts. After he personally sold a sixteenyear-old boy two "girlie" magazines in violation of a New York statute forbidding such sales to minors, he was prosecuted and convicted.
In his appeal, he argued that the scope of constitutionally protected
freedom of expression cannot depend on the age of the citizen.36 If the
material in question is not considered obscene (and therefore outside
the ambit of constitutional protection) for non-minors, then it is unconstitutional to restrict its distribution to minors.
The Court rejected Ginsberg's argument. In the opinion of the
Court, Justice Brennan cited Princein support of the proposition that
the power of the state over minors' conduct reaches farther than that
over adults. 37 The question, then, was whether New York's exercise of
its power had a reasonable basis, rooted in the difference between
minors and adults. Brennan insisted that it did. As a general matter,
he stated, the state has "an independent interest in the well-being of
its youth," independent, that is, both of other state interests and even
of parental interests. 38 Quoting Mishkin v. New York, Brennan argued
34. Id. at 178.
35. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
36. Id. at 636.
37. Id. at 638.
38. Id. at 640. Brennan observed that the New York statute could also be justified as supporting parents in the discharge of their interest in the well-being of their children. Id. at 639.
This provided the entering wedge for Justice Fortas' dissent. The majority's decision, he ob-
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that the contested statute merely "adjusts the definition of obscenity
'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to
be assessed in terms of the sexual interests...' of such minors."3 9
To be sure, New York was not free simply to assert the relevant
difference as the basis of its statute. A subsection of the disputed law
stated a legislative finding that the material prohibited to minors is "a
basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of our
youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state. ' 40 As
Brennan dryly noted, "It is very doubtful that this finding expresses
an accepted scientific fact."' But the absence of scientific proof is not
fatal. Unlike efforts to restrict protected expression, where a showing
of grave or immanent danger would be essential, in the case of obscenity, it is only necessary for the Court to determine that it is "not
irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors. '42 In short, the strength
of the state's interest in the well-being of minors, coupled with the
diminished protection for speech deemed obscene, has the effect of
significantly reducing the burden of justification the state must discharge.
Justice Stewart concurred in the result but offered a different argument. He began by noting that while a "doctrinaire, knee-jerk application of the First Amendment would ... dictate the nullification
of this New York statute," attention to the purposes and presuppositions of that amendment allow us to avoid that result.43 The Constitution, Stewart wrote, "secures ... the liberty of each man to decide for
himself what he will read and to what he will listen. The Constitution
guarantees, in short, a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose."44
Suppose that the capacity to make a choice is absent. Under such
circumstances, Stewart pointed out, government regulation of expression is not only consistent with, but may actually implement, First
jected, "give[s] the State a role in the rearing of children which is contrary to our traditions and
to our conception of family responsibility." Id. at 674 (Fortas, J., dissenting). The New York
statute does not confine itself to materials that "all sensible parents would condemn." Rather, it
"denies to children free access to books and works of art to which many parents may wish their
children to have uninhibited access." Id.
39. Id. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)).
40. Id. at 641.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 648-49 (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
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Amendment guarantees. For example, the Constitution itself prohibits anyone from foisting his uninvited and unwelcome views on a
"captive audience. '45 This line of argument, Stewart reasoned, has
important consequences for minors: "a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delimited areas, a child-like
someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity
for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees. '46 It is only on that basis, Steward concludes, that a state
may legitimately deprive minors of other rights, such as the right to
marry or to vote, the denial of which would be "constitutionally intol47
erable" for adults.
The third case I will review is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.48 The
facts were as follows: On a Tuesday afternoon at around two o'clock,
a radio station aired a satiric humorist's long monologue which, under
the guise of exploring words that could not be used on the public airwaves, proceeded to list and repeat various expressions related to
sexual and excretory functions. A man who had heard the broadcast
while driving with his young son complained to the FCC, which subsequently issued both an order holding that the station had exposed
itself to administrative sanctions and an opinion declaring and clarify49
ing its power to regulate "indecent" broadcasts.
By a slim and divided majority, the Supreme Court ultimately
ruled in favor of the FCC. The opinion of the Court, different parts of
which were joined by different justices within the majority, noted that
the FCC's objections to the broadcast were based in part on its content. If the First Amendment prohibits all content-related restriction
on speech (as the defendant argued), then clearly the FCC's action
must fail. But the First Amendment does no such thing. The Court
has repeatedly found that certain words uttered in certain contexts
stand outside the ambit of constitutional protection. There is no right
to shout fire in a crowded theater, no right to speech calculated to
provoke a fight, no right to obscenity. 0
The constitutional analysis of speech is complicated by the diversity of media. "We have long recognized," said the Court, that "each
medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 649-50.
Id.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 729-31.
Id. at 744-745.
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And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection."'" There are
two principal reasons for this special treatment. First, the broadcast
media are uniquely pervasive and intrusive, even penetrating the privacy of the home, where the citizen's right to be left alone is a powerful counterweight to freedom of expression. Second, "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.... The
ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material,
coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting."52
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell took note of a special difficulty raised by this case, and others like it. In most instances, he observed, the dissemination of indecent material to children (printed
and recorded materials, motion pictures, and live exhibitions in theaters) may be limited without also limiting the access of willing adults.5 3
Not so for broadcasting, at least during most broadcast hours, and
certainly not in the afternoon. It may well be argued, continued Powell, that
despite society's right to protect its children from this kind of
speech, and despite everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case is
impermissible because it prevents willing adults from listening to
[the] monologue over the radio in the early afternoon hours. It is
said that this ruling will have the effect of 'reduc[ing]
5 4 the adult
population.., to [hearing] only what is fit for children.'
Powell acknowledged that this objection was not without merit and
that it should affect the development of more precise standards. Under some circumstances, he implied, the effort to protect a relatively
small number of children from a relatively modest harm could come
at excessive cost to the liberty of adults. A common sense balancing
strategy is appropriate, administratively and judicially, for evaluating
such tradeoffs.5
Among other factors, this balancing test should take into account
the ability of adults to readily obtain access to restricted materials in
other ways. They could purchase the record containing the monologue, attend a live performance, or read a transcript. Moreover,

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

748 (citation omitted).
749-50.
concurring).
757-58 (Powell, J.,
760 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
758-60.
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there was nothing in the FCC's order that would necessarily prevent
the radio station from broadcasting the monologue during late evening hours when few children were likely to be within earshot. Once
the high-order interests of children are pitted against First Amendment freedoms, our only sensible recourse is deliberation guided by
context-specific patterns of facts and balances of benefits and bur56
dens.
Finally, I will review the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. American Library Association, Inc.57 In a ruling handed down
on June 23, 2003, all members of the Court appeared to find a compelling governmental interest in protecting minors from inappropriate
material. Six justices found no constitutional impediment to the requirement of the Children's Internet Protection Act that libraries
must install anti-pornography "filtering" software on their Internet
terminals as a condition for receiving various forms of federal assistance. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that public libraries are not pure public fora, but rather "necessarily consider content in making collective decisions" and enjoy a
right to do so. 8 A public library "does not have an obligation to add
material to its collection simply because the material is constitutionally protected."5 9 In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer argued that
a library's exercise of its "editing" or "selection" function does not
trigger the application of strict scrutiny-the most demanding test of
constitutionality. 6° The question then is not whether the filtering is the
least restrictive means of protecting children, but whether it is reasonably related to that end and does not impose an undue burden on
adults.
The plurality opinion also argued that the congressional mandate
is not an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds:
"[B]ecause public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic
materials from their other collections, Congress could reasonably
impose a parallel limitation on its Internet assistance programs. ' 61
Finally, the Chief Justice noted that, to the extent that the software
erroneously blocks access to protected speech, the remedy is straightforward: adult patrons may ask librarians to unblock the sites in ques56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 760-761.
123 S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
Id. at 2304.
Id. at 2307 n.4.
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2308.
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tion.62 Justice Kennedy emphasized this possibility in his concurring
opinion: If, as the government claims, libraries are both willing and
able to unblock these sites, then the ability of adult users to have ac63
cess to protected materials is not burdened to any significant degree.
In short, making use of a range of widely accepted constitutional
standards, a solid majority of the Court was able to square the protection of children with the requirements of the First Amendment. In so
doing, it affirmed and extended the basic thrust of the line of cases I
discussed earlier in this Article.
CONCLUSION

As I said at the outset, I am sympathetic to the basic thrust of
Professor Etzioni's analysis. That said, my inquiry leaves me less convinced than he appears to be that the constitutional status quo is inadequate to deal with the practical issues he raises. In particular, the
principle that the meaning and weight of First Amendment rights
varies with the age of individuals is well established, as is the existence of an independent, significant state interest in protecting the
well-being of minors. Nor am I as skeptical as Etzioni appears to be
about the viability of content restrictions on expression, especially
within the framework of age-relative liberties. I agree with Etzioni
that it is preferable to seek technological arrangements that, so far as
possible, decouple the access and exposure of minors to forms of expression from that of adults. Still, settled law suggests that even when
it is technically impossible to separate restraints on minors from restraints on adults, restrictions on expression may still be constitutionally valid. We are not, fortunately, in poor Shylock's position,
forbidden to carve the flesh of restricted access to minors unless we
can avoid shedding even a drop of blood of impeded access to adults.

62. Id. at 2306-07.
63. Id. at 2310.

